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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Firewalls are important tools in computer system protection. A firewall is a 
computer system that sits between a protected network area and the rest of the network 
and attempts to stop malicious traffic from entering the protected network, while 
allowing legitimate traffic to pass in or out. In other words, firewalls are an effective 
security mechanism for protecting a local computer system or network of systems from 
network-based security threats and vulnerabilities while at the same time supporting 
access to the outside world. 
3COM Corporation ® (3COM) Embedded Firewall System (EFW) is a newly 
introduced firewall system that has a solution for one of the most important limitations of 
firewalls, preventing insider attacks. Moving the firewall from perimeter into one more 
step back in defense-in-depth approach [NSA2005], the firewall functions now work on 
the critical point in the network, Network Interface Card (NIC). EFW works on lower 
network layers, unlike software based firewalls running at higher layers on the local host. 
By processing data at the lower layers, EFW can improve processing speed and increase 
performance. In addition, it is not as easy to deactivate EFW as with software based 
firewalls because attacker needs to have a physical access to the host computer in order to 
disable the NIC. 
However, there has been always a trade-off between the performance and utilities 
of a security system. One can not expect from a particular security system to comprise all 
of the utilities and also have the best performance. Furthermore, estimating efficiency of 
a security product, such as a firewall system, is a very hard task itself and demands a 
great amount of knowledge, time and resources.  
B. MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES 
Although, there is not a well-defined procedure to evaluate a firewall system so as 
to be sure that it fulfils the security requirements of an organization or company, there are 
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some recent studies in order to describe the standards and provide methodology for 
analysis of firewalls.  
Firewall providers have no doubt had done some testing on their product, prior to 
distribution. However, being absent from an approval whose job is only to evaluate in 
objective manner, these testing should not be taken as a proof of meeting the terms of a 
valuable firewall.  
The goal of this research is to evaluate the 3COM EFW as a newly developed 
firewall system. The research follows the methodology and standardization offered for 
firewall performance analysis by RFC 2647 and RFC 3511, when applicable. 
The thesis provides information on whether EFW is a usable tool in a 
comprehensive network defense system. Also, the thesis discusses the benefits for 
network security in general and specially for military networks.  
C. ORGANIZATION 
The main ideas of seven chapters building this thesis are as follows: 
• Chapter I – Introduction: Identifies the purpose behind conducting this research, 
establishes the goals for thesis.  
• Chapter II – Background: Provides information on firewalls and summarizes the 
previous studies related to EFW. 
• Chapter III –Embedded Firewall System: Demonstrates basic principles behind 
EFW system. 
• Chapter IV – Related Work: Lists previous studies specifically on EFW and 
firewall evaluation methods in general. 
• Chapter V – EFW System Evaluation: States how the testing is done and how the 
result data is collected and analyzed. Presents the data collected from testing and 
discusses about the results. 
• Chapter VI – Summary: Explains the research results and make recommendations 





The requirements for Information Security have changed radically during the last 
few years. The revolution started with the invention of the computer. Computers 
increased the need for security more electronically rather than the old style of physical 
and administrative security. Another change came with the ability of communication 
between the computers which generated the need for security of information traveling in 
the network between the computers, defined as network security. But such a security 
definition is still missing some point, security of collection of networks connected to each 
other, which is covered by internet security.  
These categories of security may interact with each other what makes it very hard 
to say exactly which one is ending and the other is starting at a particular location. NIC 
stands in one of such a critical point that may be accepted as a boundary between these 
categories. NIC resides on the computer but it is starting point for networking, more 
significantly, it is the only point where attacking traffic can use to enter the system to be 
attacked. 
However, attacking traffic does not necessarily enter the system from the world 
outside always; instead a demoralized or annoyed user in the home network, a.k.a. inside 
attacker, may trigger such an attack traffic emerging from inside of the protected 
network. Obviously, NIC is also the only point an inside attacker can exploit the 
vulnerabilities of home network and make the information accessible to unauthorized 
people. Users inside of the home network may not be generating such a harmful traffic 
intentionally, however recent studies show that percentage of attacks by insiders is 
increasing considerably.  
There are two main approaches for preventing attacking in networking. One is 
focusing on computer security, hardening the possible vulnerabilities in Operating 
System (OS) or even in hardware level, also known as defense-in-depth approach. The 
other one is to take actions closer to network security side which consists of putting 
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protection efforts such as filtering and encryption into a perimeter defense concept.  
Firewalls have been one of the most common and simplest ways of perimeter defense 
techniques; they work by filtering the traffic going out or coming in. But, as the same for 
almost every protection mechanism, firewalls have their own limitations.  
They are very efficient in preventing access to inside network if the rule set is 
defined convincingly. In contrast, they are not very successful at avoiding the attacks 
originated from inside. Moreover, during the filtering process, firewalls have to consume 
some resources of their host. In fact, sometimes resources are so limited that a firewall 
may take hold of a great proportion or even all of resources. In that case, the firewall 
itself becomes the bottleneck and the performance of network decreases considerably. On 
the other hand, sometimes there may be a number of firewalls spread into network in 
order to avoid firewall from becoming the bottleneck. Nevertheless, the control of more 
than a reasonable number of firewalls may raise a management problem at that point.  
More firewalls may cause a need for more concentrated communication between control 
unit and firewalls, which limits the scalability of the network actually.  
B. OVERVIEW  
During the last years, the war between the security professionals and hackers 
caused more efficient firewall systems to appear. In the early years, it was sufficient to 
have a firewall, in a perimeter defense concept, but; in this day, perimeter firewalls are no 
longer acceptable. Moreover, today’s networks in general are no longer have clearly 
definable perimeters.  
Modern firewalls are closer to the defense-in-depth model, which can be simply 
defined as “don’t put all your eggs in one basket” strategy of security. Additionally, many 
attack attempts fail to penetrate well-configured firewalls, especially if they have a “deny 
everything not specifically allowed” policy. 
EFW is an implementation of defense-in-depth approach indeed. It moves the 
firewall  from  software  into  hardware  level  and  allows  using another layer in defense  
5 
 
design. Moreover, it has a control and management architecture which allows the 
network administrators easily audit the network attacks and take required counter 
measures.  
C. COMPARISION OF CONVENTIONAL AND MODERN FIREWALL 
SYSTEMS 
The most important cause of changes in the firewall design was naturally what 
was expected from them. These expectations listed below become also the main design 
principles of firewalls: [Cheswick2003] 
• By restricting access to the network, all data transfer should be done via 
firewall. 
• Security policy should be carefully followed in the decision process on 
allowing and preventing network traffic. If more than one security policy 
exists, then different policies may be assigned to different firewalls. 
• OS used in the system should not allow unauthorized access to the firewall.  
In order to reach these goals, firewalls have used different kind of techniques to 
control access and enforce the site’s security policy. [Smith1997] lists four of these 
general techniques: 
• Service Control: The firewall decides on which services are allowed in the 
host network. The decision may be done based on the investigation of header 
information such as source address. Furthermore, a proxy may be set in order 
to interpret every service request and process.  
• Direction control: The firewall determines directions to which are the services 
are allowed or denied. Some services are allowed in both inbound and 
outbound connections, some are allowed for only one way. 
• User control: The firewall controls the access level for the users inside of the 
network. The control mechanism can also be applied to outside users by 
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implementing a Virtual Private Network (VPN), and using appropriate 
encryption mechanism such as Internet Security Protocol (IPSEC).  
• Behavior control: Some of the firewalls are able to control the behaviors 
of the particular services as well. For example, a firewall may look at in 
the attachment of an e-mail in order to eliminate viruses. 
The various numbers of design goals and techniques caused to come out different 
and inconsistent names for the various firewall systems. The classification of these 
approaches needs to separate these systems more structurally and functionally. Three 
main specifications may help to have a more generic classification: Location, storage and 
filtering level.  
1. Location 
Firewalls may be integrated into a router, switch or a NIC.  Basically, a router that 
has Access Control Lists (ACL) configured may be considered as a firewall. These ACLs 
inspect various header fields against the rule set in order to make routing decisions.  
Furthermore, there may be one firewall protecting whole network by standing on 
the gateway of the network which is known as network-based approach, or multiple 
firewalls may be distributed through the network, also known as host-based approach.  
In the network based approach, firewall is located at the gateway of the network 
or subnet. The main problem of that approach is not being able to filter packets that are 
not leaving network, residing inside instead.  
In the host based approach, each host has its own firewall. The main problem of 
this approach is to control the firewalls. An acceptable solution is connecting each host to 
a particular node in order to provide central control.  
2. Recollection 
Filtering is an automated way of making things easier for security of 
communication. However, some of the earlier firewalls were missing a basic principle of 
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computing which is classified as recollection. Recollection involves storing and 
retrieving information. [Denning2003] 
Recollection can be added by including a memory into firewalls. This memory 
holds a table in order to keep track of connections already established. This 
implementation helps some of protocols such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to run 
through a firewall. FTP is a communication protocol which is using connection oriented 
capability of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). By design, FTP server opens a new 
connection to a random port like such as 5064.  After a FTP session is started, both 
receiving and transmitting sides keep the connection alive in order to avoid overload of 
connection establishment. However, if a firewall is located between these communicating 
sides, this firewall has to also be aware of a connection that will be active for a while. 
The firewalls with an ability to do recollection are defined as dynamic or stateful 
firewalls whereas the others are defined as static or stateless. 
A dynamic or stateful firewall creates a directory for each established connection. 
This makes it possible to tighten rules in order to let incoming traffic to the ports that fit 
the profile of the entries in this directory. For FTP example above, a dynamic firewall 
will create an entry for the FTP server’s IP and port number, which is 5064 in our case. 
When a packet comes from this specific IP and port number, the firewall will look at its 
table and discover that a connection is already established between a client in the 
protected network and the FTP server.  
On the other side, a static or stateless firewall makes its decisions on an individual 
packet and does not take into consideration packets before this particular one. Firewall 
has to do processing in order to allow or deny every packet passing by if there is not a 
well defined rule for this particular packet. An FTP packet with a destination port such as 
5064 will be dropped by a stateless firewall, although it is a part of a legitimate FTP 
session. 
3. Filtering Level 
Each kind of networking involves some abstraction in order to provide more 
modularity and reduce complexity. A standard way is to put some kind of header or 
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trailer to the packet when it is traveling through the layers of Open System Initiation 
(OSI) model. Headers may have lots of information about what is carried in payload, but 
sometimes it may not be enough for a firewall to decide whether the packet should be 
allowed to pass or not. There are methods like tunneling a packet inside of another packet 
that are used by attackers widely. 
In the tunneling method, attacker puts the malicious code inside of an innocently 
looking packet. Internet Control Management Protocol (ICMP) packet tunneling is a 
classic example for tunneling attacks. Most of the network administrators simply allow 
ICMP in order to help network management. However, an attack, by using “Loki” tool 
easily found in the Internet, can easily be organized by sending remote control commands 
to a victim computer by hiding them in ICMP packets. Some of firewalls only look at the 
headers but not in the payload when they are performing filtering. This may leave the 
remote commands in ICMP packet unnoticed when it is penetrating into home network 
even though it should not be let passing through the firewall.  
Other kind of firewalls looks deeper all the way to the payload and inspects the 
payload as well. For sure, this demands a greater effort of the device but this yields more 
intelligent filtering. Moreover, some application firewalls merge Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) and firewall abilities at the same device.  Firewalls with IDS capability 
compare the traffic patterns with known attack signatures, when filtering the arriving 
packets based on the ACL as well.  
As a result, by using these techniques and aiming to reach the goals stated above, 
one can expect following capabilities from a firewall: 
• A firewall supplies a single point that keeps unauthorized users out of the 
network, prohibits potentially vulnerable services leaving the network and 
provides protection for different kind of IP spoofing and routing attacks. 
• A firewall provides ability to monitor the network traffic in order to audit 




Although they are not security related, a firewall may serve as a platform for 
Network Address Translation (NAT) and Port Address Translation (PAT). Moreover, 
using tunneling method defensively this time, VPNs can be established through firewalls. 
However, firewalls are a protection mechanism used in perimeter defense so far. 
If there are vulnerabilities and threats inside of the perimeter, firewalls basically fail. 
Some of these vulnerabilities are the following:  
• The firewall cannot protect the attacks that bypass the firewall such as a dial-
up connection made between an internal system and an Internet Service 
Provider (ISP).  
• The firewall does not protect against an internal threat such as an employee of 
a company who corporate with an external attacker. 
• The firewall may not be able to protect against the transfer of malicious code 
such as virus-infected files. Because of large variety of OSs and applications 
need to be supported inside the perimeter; it would be impractical for the 
firewall to scan everything incoming. 
D. PROS AND CONS OF HOST-BASED FIREWALLS 
In the host based approach, host performs the firewall function locally. The 
primary advantage of this approach is the ability to detect attacks that is not only 
traveling across the network, but also going from a computer to another one in the same 
network.  
In a common scenario a hacker will often gain access to a web server or mail 
server inside the home network. Once the user privileges are obtained, the hacker will 
attempt to elevate his or her privileges to root or administrator level. After the desired 
level of access has been achieved, the intruder can place a “Trojan horse”, modify system 
and security logs, run packet-sniffing applications and furthermore take over other 
computers on the network.  By preventing the exchange information between computers 
in the home network, host based firewalls stop the hacker from capturing more 
information from the network. 
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Even though host based approach may look more efficient than network based 
approach in this point, it has some limitations: 
• Data processing impacts performance of the hosts.  
• Every host needs a host based firewall to be installed. 
• If the host is compromised, firewall process can be detected and possibly 
terminated. 
• Maintenance of security profiles is harder and needs more resources.  
In the network based approach, firewall is located on the gateway of the network. 
One of the advantages of this approach is to be able to see traffic that is destined for 
multiple hosts. Another advantage is not to have an impact on the performance of the 
hosts except the one hosting firewall. Additionally, management is simpler because there 
isn’t a distributed topology as is in the host-based approach. Both processing and 
controlling may be done at one particular point in the network. On the other hand, 
network based approach have some weaknesses such as the ones listed below: 
• It may loose some packets if the traffic gets heavy. 
• It will not prevent host based attacks or host to host attacks that do not travel 
across the network link. 
E. THE ADVANTAGE OF CENTRAL CONTROL IN NETWORK 
SECURITY 
Management of host based firewall systems is more difficult than network based 
model especially when maintenance is considered. Many organizations do not have the 
resources to provide each and every employee with a dedicated station. In these 
environments users often share a workstation, carrying different functions with them, 
making it very difficult to maintain the desired security policy while providing efficient 
service to all users.  
Moreover, although security issues in a network can be handled by each of the 
nodes in the network; if the number of the hosts is reasonably small, this is not true for 
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larger networks. Management of network security on a large network can be more 
difficult as network administrators have to deal with the task of setting up a number of 
patches and updates to various platforms periodically. Although in most of the cases the 
majority of the users will share common needs and applications, some of the users and 
groups may have special needs. Web servers, mail servers, name servers and many other 
hosts are example nodes that are requiring a different security profile. Centralization and 
automation of control may save valuable time and effort at this time.  
Central control allows network administrators to regulate the behaviors of the 
network against different types of attacks. Administrators do not have to walk off to 
every host in order to configure security rules. They are able to do it from a central node 
in the network or even further, from outside the home network by connecting to this 
particular node remotely.  
F. SUMMARY 
Firewalls are naturally changing due to the needs emerging from newest 
vulnerabilities and threats discovered. One of these threats to old fashioned firewalls is 
the possibility of attack from insiders.  
Lately developed firewall systems, such as EFW, usually have multiple 
components located at hosts in the network and they aim to solve insider attack problem 
in a defense-in-depth approach. But managing this system appears like another problem 
when every host has a firewall of its own. Moreover, putting all these functionalities into 







































III. EMBEDDED FIREWALL SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many network administrators have installed one or more firewall systems 
between their network and the Internet to filter traffic. These firewalls usually examine 
network-oriented properties of traffic, like source addresses and protocol identifiers. As 
observed in the Chapter II, by installing the firewall at the perimeter, the network is 
protected against external attacks. A well-known shortcoming of network-based firewalls 
is that they only protect the network from outsider’s attacks.  
 Host-based firewalls, which are usually implemented at software layer, can 
address insider attack problem by placing the firewall on the individual host. The host-
based firewall will block attacks regardless of whether they originate from outside or 
inside. However, host-based firewalls focus on solutions that were installed into the 
host’s OS. This type of installation has the weakness that an attacker can disable the 
firewall if an attack on the host succeeds. EFW yields an alternative approach that 
incorporates advantages of both host-based and perimeter-based systems as today’s 
modern firewall.  
B. OVERVIEW OF EFW 
The 3COM EFW uses a client - server based system, where the client PC installs 
the EFW client NIC and have the security policies on the EFW centrally controlled by a 
server machine.   
Server side of the software allows network administrator to define a firewall rule 
set, through a centrally managed console and issues defined rules to the EFW cards by a 
Policy Server that is responsible of storing and distributing “policies” to clients.  A policy 
in fact, is an ACL that determines what action will be taken when a typical kind of packet 




C. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The EFW consists of following architectural components: 
• Management console 
• Policy servers 
• Devices 
• Domains  
Figure 1 below demonstrates these components and the connection between them 
in one EFW domain. All computers in the figure are assumed to have an EFW NIC 
(Device) installed.   
 
Figure 1.   Components of EFW system 
1. Management Console 
Management Console is the administrative interface to the Policy Server. 
Administrators configure the system and observe the system data using the console. 
Management console may be on the same computer where the policy server is, or it may 
be on a remote host. Moreover, Microsoft ® Management Console (MMC) of Windows 




2. Policy Servers 
The Policy Server controls EFW devices by implementing administrative orders 
received from Management Console. Policy Server converts high-level commands sent 
from Management Console into ACL rules that EFW devices can enforce during packet 
filtering. Furthermore, Policy Server receives and processes “heartbeat” messages from 
EFW devices that contain IP address and recent policy status of the devices.  Also, Policy 
Server receives and processes audit messages coming from EFW devices. Policy Server 
stores the data used in policies and auditing information via a Database Management 
System (DBMS).  
3. Devices 
EFW devices filter the packets incoming and outgoing based on the ACL rules 
distributed by Policy Server via policies. The 3COM EFW NIC is different for servers, 
workstations and laptops. Mobile NIC used for laptops supports roaming feature, i.e. NIC 
can be used either in the protected network with a distributed policy or in another 
network with a pre-saved offline policy. 
4. Domains 
An EFW domain consists of one Policy Server and a number of EFW devices. 
Dividing network into multiple domains decreases the control message load in the 
network and ensures that only necessary messages are distributed to one particular Policy 
Server. Conversely, Policy Servers are responsible for distributing policies only to the 
clients which are in their domain.  
A policy defined within an EFW domain can be assigned to any EFW device in 
that domain. Furthermore, audit queries can search all audit data generated within a 
domain.  
3COM recommends not exceeding 1000 devices in a particular domain. 
Moreover, 3COM advises to have a back-up Policy Server for enhanced availability. 




D. OPERATION OF SYSTEM 
When an EFW device boots up, it connects to Policy Server in order to download 
the policy assigned to it. If EFW device cannot download the policy for any reason, then 
it goes with the policy that it used at the last time. In the case of a roaming device, the 
EFW device first figures out its location and then acts in the proper way based on 
whether it is in a EFW domain or not. If the roaming device is in an EFW domain, it 
follows the same step with a stationary EFW device. Otherwise, the roaming device 
enters a “fallback” mode and loads a pre-saved offline policy. In other words, a roaming 
device may have two policies, one policy for its local network and another policy for a 
remote network.  
 Stationary devices operating normally, enforcing the latest issued policy continues 
to do so until a “wake-up” occurs and reset the cards. Wake-up is a short message that 
alerts the Policy Server about a significant event that happens on the EFW device such as 
boot up or reset. 
EFW devices periodically send “heartbeat” messages to the Policy Server. 
Heartbeat message is a short message informing the Policy Server that a particular EFW 
device is operational.  If a policy distribution fails to a secured host, next heartbeat from 
this particular host helps the Policy Server to determine the failure in distribution and 
sends the policy to the host again.  
EFW devices send audit messages to Policy Server. However, if Policy Server is 
not reachable at a moment, EFW devices do not keep audit messages. All audit messages 
are recorded in DBMS of Policy Server and they can be viewed via Management Console 
at any time.  
E. IPSEC OFF-LOADING 
IPSEC is a standard for securing IP communication by encrypting and 
authenticating IP packets.  The specification of IPSEC is defined in 1998 [RFC 2401].  
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has an official working group studying to make 
IPSEC architecture a standard for IP packet traffic. As a result, IPSEC is expected to 
become more widely deployed.  
EFW devices contain a special chip set and associated firmware to provide 
cryptographic acceleration for data links using the IPSEC protocol. In particular, the 
board of NIC contains specialized integrated circuits to provide 3-key Data Encryption 
System (3DES) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA1) integrity. IPSEC off-loading feature 
allows part of the encryption processing to be carried out on the NIC instead of the CPU 
of the host PC. The acceleration in IPSEC processing of EFW system is examined in the 
Chapter V.   
F. PROS AND CONS OF THE SYSTEM 
Management Console and Policy Server together constructs the central control 
mechanism of EFW. As we discussed previously, centralization helps administrators to 
control the behaviors of the network against different types of attacks. Interface offered 
by MMC makes controlling process more user-friendly. However, EFW uses a variety 
messages such as heartbeat messages in order to maintain this central control mechanism. 
A trade-off appears between performance and utilities of the EFW system.  
EFW devices are actually host-based firewalls, of which pros and cons discussed 
in Chapter II. Different from conventional host-based firewalls, system packet filtering in 
EFW is done at the NIC, mostly in hardware level.  Locating the firewall at NIC prevents 
an attack possibility based on compromising the OS running on the host. Moreover, 
performing filtering at NIC should increase the performance of firewall, which is 
examined at Chapter V.  
EFW system has the ability to off-load IPSEC cryptography processing from the 
OS to NIC, which enhances IPSEC performance. EFW treats IPSEC like any other 
protocol. That is, it can permit or deny it. The performance gain of EFW from off-loading 





EFW is proposed as a combination of host-based and hardware firewalls that 
merge advantages of two firewall approaches. The architecture of EFW consists of four 
main components. These are Policy Server, Management Console, EFW devices and the 
domain that contains one or more of other components. EFW components communicate 
with each other to maintain consistency between server and clients.  
EFW may be integrated with other systems in order to serve in a defense-in-depth 
approach. One of the main advantage brings EFW in front of other systems is its ability 
to off-load IPSEC process into EFW NIC. Certainly, EFW has a lot more advantages than 


















IV. RELATED WORK 
In this section, previously conducted academic studies and research of industrial 
organizations will be reviewed. First, we will summarize the studies directly related to 
the evaluation of EFW. Secondly, we will investigate published answers to the question 
of “how the firewall evaluation should be performed?”   
A. INTRODUCTION 
EFW is newly developed system so there has not been much analysis and 
evaluation work done to it. In fact, the concept of evaluation of security systems, 
including firewalls, started only a few years ago. Most of the companies do some 
benchmarking tests before deciding what kind of a firewall they may use for securing 
their network. Benchmarking involves running a number of tests and trials against 
different firewall systems to evaluate the relative performance.  
 However, when a fundamentally new system like EFW is proposed, existing 
benchmarking techniques becomes limited and impracticable. Benchmarking defines a 
set of metrics and compares their measured values to those of a system judged to be the 
best.  However, in case of evaluation of a fundamentally novel system, metrics are not 
well defined yet and there is not such a best system for comparison. The evaluation 
method of EFW as a new firewall system should be more general, combining both 
theoretical ideas and practical specifications of all systems and provide a fair platform for 
comparison of different systems.    
B. OVERVIEW 
Previous studies on EFW system have already showed results regarding the basic 
security utilities of the newly proposed system. Students at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) [Burrows2004] evaluated the EFW system under simulated Denial of 
Service (DOS) attacks. Another study [Stewart2004] focused on the integration of EFW 
with other firewall systems available in order to represent a defense-in-depth portrait of 
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network security. Besides these academic studies, industry also carried out study on 
whether EFW allows more secure network structure. Secure Computing Corporation 
provided a mechanism to enforce privacy rules recently established under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) by using the EFW system 
[Secure2001].  
There is also some standardization study for evaluation of firewall systems. A 
Request for Comments (RFC) issued recently offers a benchmarking methodology for 
firewall performance [RFC3511]. In addition, RFC 2647 gives a list of benchmarking 
terminology for firewall performance analysis. In this chapter, the related studies are 
summarized. 
C. EFW’S ROLE IN DDOS ATTACKS 
The Master’s thesis work titled “Evaluation of Embedded Firewall System and Its 
Role in Protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) Attacks” 
[Burrows2004] tested several security features offered by EFW that help protecting 
against variety of attack types.  EFW pre-defined policies, such as “No Sniffing”, that 
help network administrators to create more detailed policy configurations were validated 
in this thesis work. Ethereal Network Protocol Analyzer (ENPA) was installed onto one 
client and placed into a policy that permitted packet sniffing. While the ENPA was 
running, the security policy for this particular client was changed so that it no longer was 
authorized to act promiscuously. The policy change was successful and the client was no 
more able to operate in promiscuous mode despite running the same ENPA process.   
The thesis also discussed ways to map various policies of Information Control 
(INFOCON), the comprehensive defense posture and response based plans that used by 
Department of Defense (DOD), to the EFW client policy set.  EFW provides a convenient 
way to enforce and change the security postures on individual client based on INFOCON 
levels.  In addition, the thesis found vulnerability in the audit mechanism of EFW.   
Although EFW is capable of preventing IP address spoofing, it cannot prevent attacker 
from spoofing the MAC address on the client. Since some of the OS like Windows 2000 
and Windows XP allow a user to change the MAC address of a NIC, an attacker can use 
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this feature in order to spoof his/her identity. EFW system uses MAC address as the 
unique key for storing audit records sent from clients at the policy server. But, policy 
server only checks MAC address when client is first registered to server and relies on 
solely on the IP addresses for policy updates. This means that a client with a spoofed 
MAC address will continue to receive policy updates, but it will never be able to send 
audit messages to the server until its MAC address is reset to the same MAC address at 
the time of the card’s registration.  
The thesis also carried out performance evaluation and concluded that EFW 
offered some very practical security advantages such as ability to centralize security 
control while maintaining host-based packet filtering processing. However, the 
weaknesses of the EFW system include limited protection from Distributed Denial of 
Services (DDOS) attacks, limited auditing, and poor throughput performance compared 
to regular NICs.  
D. EMBEDDED FIREWALL DEFENSE 
The study from United States Military Academy (USMA) [Stewart2004] focused 
the use of NICs with embedded firewalls to supplement the security provided network-
based firewalls. By using EFW in combination with other firewalls, the study showed 
that fighting against infections in an internal network is possible. Moreover, combining 
multiple firewall systems let administrators to enforce policies to computers, relieve the 
users of responsibility for managing their firewall and maintain central control over 
firewall rules.  
 The study also suggested an evaluation in order to test effectiveness of EFW NIC 
by building a small network consisting at least one Policy Server and one exploitable 
client. The first part in the suggested evaluation is to test some of the basic functionality 
of the Policy Server and its ability to create and distribute rules. The second part tests the 
ability of the embedded firewalls to fight against an infection on the internal network.  
 The evaluation classifies four different results that EFW may have for a typical 
attack. These results are summarized below.  
22 
 
• Causes no impact: The policy server cannot prevent attack. 
• Mitigates the effects: A firewall rule can be created that can mitigate some of 
the effects of attack. 
• Prevents propagation: A firewall rule can be created that halts the spread of an 
infection. 
• Causes the attack to fail: A firewall rule can be created that prevents the attack 
from starting.  
The study concluded that although current EFW implementations do not have a 
special NIC for every type of network connections, for example, there is not a wireless 
EFW NIC at the moment, a significant number of computer systems can still be 
protected. This will safeguard a large portion of today’s networks while fighting against 
the infection in the rest. 
E. BENCHMARKING TERMINOLOGY FOR FIREWALL PERFORMANCE  
RFC 2647, titled “Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall Performance”, defines 
terms used in measuring the performance of firewalls. The primary metrics used in the 
document are forwarding rate and connection-oriented measurements.  
Forwarding rate is defined as “The number of bits per second of allowed traffic a 
DUT/SUT1 can be observed to transmit to the correct destination interface(s) in response 
to a specified offered load”. Connection is defined as “A state in which two hosts, or a 
host and the DUT/SUT, agree to exchange data using a known protocol”. TCP is given as 
the main example protocol that can be used in a connection.  
RFC2647 does not provide a definition for throughput but defines “goodput” as 
“The number of bits per unit of time forwarded to the correct destination interface of the 
DUT/SUT, minus any bits lost or retransmitted.”  The measurements in this research does 
not separate bits as good or bad, since all of the packets generated are measured in the 
tests. Therefore, instead of the term “goodput”, a more general term “throughput” is used. 
                                                 
1
 Device under Test (DUT) and System under Test (SUT) are defined in RFC 2285. They are basically 
device(s) which stimulus is offered and response measured.  
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Furthermore, since EFW is not a network-based firewall, and network traffic does not go 
through EFW to another system but directly to the host computer itself through the PCI 
bus attached to the EFW NIC, it is not possible to measure the rate of bits forwarded to a 
correct destination as defined in RFC 2647. Therefore, using a similar model, forwarding 
rate measurements are done by directing bits back to the sender, and TCP is used in a 
connection oriented scheme to find the forwarding rate of EFW devices.  
F. BENCHMARKING METHODOLOGY FOR FIREWALL 
PERFORMANCE  
RFC3511, titled “Benchmarking Methodology for Firewall Performance”, 
discusses and defines a number of tests that may be used to describe the performance 
characteristics of firewalls. In addition to defining the tests, the document also describes 
specific formats for reporting the results of the tests.  
Test configurations defined in the document is separated into two kinds of 
firewalls which have dual-homed and tri-homed configurations. Dual-homed firewalls are 
generally configured to be placed at a location that connects two network areas. One set 
of interfaces is attached to the protected network area, whereas the other interfaces are 
attached to the unprotected areas. Tri-homed configurations employ a third segment 
called a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in addition to the protected and unprotected areas. 
The document states a number of parameters that should be considered during the 
firewall testing. The tests defined in this document are listed below: 
• IP throughput 
• Concurrent TCP connection capacity 
• Maximum TCP connection establishment rate 
• Maximum TCP connection tear down rate 
• Denial of service handling 
• Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) transfer rate  
• Maximum HTTP transaction rate 
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• Illegal traffic handling  
• IP fragmentation handling 
• Latency 
The main interest of RFC 3511 is performance measurement. The document does 
not discuss security issues. Previous work [Burrows2004] performed “Denial of service 
handling” tests and showed that EFW can use only 1.95% of network utilization without 
dropping a single packet and EFW drops 99.03% of packets when network utilization 
reaches 90%.  In this research, IP throughput and maximum TCP transaction rate tests are 
conducted. TCP transaction rate is selected instead of HTTP, as suggested in RFC3511, 
because EFW runs at lower layers of Open Source Initiative (OSI) stack and measuring 
lower layer protocol makes the results more realistic.  
G. SIMPLIFIED HIPAA COMPLIANCE USING EFW 
Secure Computing Corporation (SCC) carried out a study on using EFW to 
enforce privacy rules recently established under the HIPAA. [Secure2001] The new 
privacy rules are intended to reduce the risk of an individual’s private health information 
being used in an inappropriate manner without person’s permission. The rules basically 
require health care organizations to restrict access to personal health information in 
accordance with employee’s roles and duties within the organization.  
The experiment shows that EFW system helps to enforce such restrictions by 
controlling data sharing between servers and clients in the organization network. The 
centralized management helps the organizations to respond to changes in privacy 
regulations and in organization’s network environment.  
SCC mainly concentrates on the conceptual side of the EFW as a system that can 






V. EFW SYSTEM EVALUATION 
A. TEST CONFIGURATIONS  
Firewalls are generally configured to be placed at a location that connects two 
network areas. One set of firewall interfaces is attached to the protected network area, 
whereas the other interfaces are attached to the unprotected network area. To a firewall, 
the protected areas are where the host network computers are; whereas the unprotected 
areas are anything located outside the host network that network administrator may have 
little or no control. Firewalls configured with two network areas are called “dual-homed” 
firewalls.  
As we discussed at Chapter IV Section F, there is another configuration, “tri-
homed” configuration, in which firewalls have a third area, DMZ, for adding more 
security by restricting access of some servers from unprotected network. Test 
configurations may be different based on the dual-homed or tri-homed firewall 
configurations. [RFC 3511] In this research, the experiments are set up in a dual-homed 
configuration. Figure 2 shows the basic test configuration of a dual-homed firewall.  
Firewall
Server/Clients Server/Clients
Protected Network Unprotected Network
 
Figure 2.   Test configuration of a dual-homed firewall 
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Firewall testing may involve a number of components in the protected and 
unprotected network areas, as well as inside the firewall system itself. For this research, 
the “black box” test approach is used as the testing method. Black box testing is a 
software engineering testing method that checks the outputs of a software program for 
given inputs in order to conform to the functional specification of the software. The inner 
workings of the software itself are not examined; therefore we kept the term “black box.” 
The reason that black box testing is appropriate for this work is that the system 
under test, i.e. the 3COM EFW, is a commercial product, that the inner working of the 
system is proprietary and is not accessible to the researchers. 3COM does not issue any 
detailed documentation about system components nor the source code of the system 
software.  
EFW system is a combination of management software and firewall card 
hardware that allows configuring centrally managed security policies. The EFW 
management software is called the Policy Server. The Policy Server allows 
administrators to control security policies on the EFW clients.  The distributed firewall 
component NIC is built on Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) technology and 
yields a throughput of 133 megabytes per second. The distributed clients and the server 
are connected via the EFW NIC, which also carries out the filtering and auditing tasks. 
 In this research, the basic test network environment includes a System under Test 
(SUT), which is a real EFW system, and emulates the protected and unprotected sides. 
Necessary applications are loaded on workstations and servers in order to evaluate the 
EFW system efficiency. 
Firewall testing may be separated to two main categories: performance tests and 
security tests. Performance tests are related to hardware aspects of firewall and involve 
more quantitative data, whereas security tests simply consist of qualitative data such as 
determining whether the firewall is able to prevent a specific type of attack. When it 
comes to measuring performance of network and computer systems, different metrics are 
used based on the functions of the systems. For example, for a web site, the number of 
simultaneous users that it can handle plays an important role in performance analysis. For 
a firewall, the maximum bit forwarding rate that it can forward is a good way of 
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describing performance. Choosing the right load to apply will ensure that SUT gets 
assessed in the proper way and the test results matter for the system. Possible quantitative 
metrics and protocols that can be used for qualifying the performance of a firewall are 
listed as in RFC 3511. This list can be found in the Chapter IV Section F. However, one 
should not ignore that testing a firewall requires assessment with a selection of different 
protocols. Because protocols have different behaviors and firewalls react to each in 
different ways, a full picture of firewall performance cannot rely on the information 
gained from just a single protocol. 
Evaluating the security of a firewall is more complicated than performance 
analysis because security metrics are harder to define than performance.  Performance 
metrics can be measured quantitatively but security metrics are mostly qualitative.  
Security parameters are generally not only derived from the architecture, but also from 
ability to prevent an increasing group of sophisticated attacks. Furthermore, performance 
and security issues are inter-related. For example, some form of attacks can basically 
decrease the performance of the firewall, making the firewall the “bottleneck” of the data 
flow.  A compromised firewall can severely degrade the performance of a network.  
B. TEST APPLICATIONS  
In this section, the software used in the experiment will be discussed. They can be 
divided into three categories, OS software, EFW software and the testing software.  
Currently only Windows based OSs work with EFW. They are Windows 98, 
Windows 2000, Windows NT, and Windows XP. Windows XP Professional Service 
Pack 1, the latest issued one among the others, is installed on all clients and the server for 
tests in this thesis.   
Only the server needs to run the EFW Policy Server software. The Policy Server 
and the Management Console can be run on separate hosts, but for our experiments, they 
are installed on the same server in order to decrease network complexity. MMC, 




 TTCP, a network performance analysis tool, is installed on the both workstations. 
It measures the throughput performance between networked components. There are a 
number of different versions of TTCP available. Most of the TTCP versions are written 
for UNIX. The version used in this research is re-designed by Gregg G. Seipp from North 
Carolina State University and runs on the Windows platforms. [Geigg2004] During the 
measurements, one of workstation is used as the transmitter and the other as the receiver. 
TTCP can be configured to send TCP or UDP packets between the transceiver and 
receiver, and it measures the throughput and response time observed over the link.  
 NMAP, a commonly used network scanning tool, is also installed to the 
transceiver host, so as to find the ports that are open in the receiver side of the testing 
configuration. NMAP sends ICMP, UDP and TCP packets to a specific address or a 
range of address and gives information about the host residing on the address. The 
information provided includes the ports open or filtered and probable OS running on the 
host.  
 The Spirent Smartbits packet generator is used for packet loss testing in this 
thesis. The packet generator is controlled via a TCL script [Spirent2001] provided by 
Spirent Communications. This script enables the NIC installed at the packet generator to 
send ICMP echo messages to the client and waits for ICMP reply messages. During the 
testing, the TCL script calculates the percentage of the replies compared to packets sent 
under different load conditions. The TCL script can also be configured to use UDP 
packets, instead of ICMP packets, for packet loss testing. In that case, in order to echo 
back the UDP packets to the packet generator, the receiver runs a program that will 
forward the UDP packets back to the packet generator.  
There are a couple of host-based firewall applications that has the ability to do 
packet-filtering. Among these programs are Zone Alarm by Zone Labs and Symantec 
Personal Firewall (SPF) by Symantec Cooperation. Host based firewall applications like 
SPF often asks the user when a service attempting to use a given port is allowed to do so 
or not. By using the answers, application sets up a base line of operations and makes 
persistent rules for future occurrences.  A user can define system-wide firewall rules that 
will affect every service’s network access. SPF has a built-in attack signature list and acts 
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like a simple IDS based on this list. The signature list is upgradeable in order to address 
latest threats.   
C. SECURITY TESTING 
EFW has a number of default defined rules that may be included into the policy 
enforced in the network. Examples of these built-in policy rules are preventing attacks 
like IP Spoofing and TCP SYN attacks. IP spoofing is controlled by disallowing a source 
address that differs from the address of the local interface. TCP SYN flood is handled by 
denying TCP connections that initiate the SYN without sending the final ACK, needed to 
start data transfer.   
1. Filtering Level Detection Test 
An important feature of a firewall is the network layer at which they can perform 
the filtering. We confirmed that EFW does filtering at transport layer. The policy server 
allows creating such rules as allow all TCP traffic and deny a specific UDP traffic from a 
particular host.  However, we are not able to confirm that EFW does further filtering, i.e. 
filtering beyond IP and TCP/UDP layer. For example, EFW does not allow network 
administrator to define exactly what type of ICMP messages are allowed to pass through 
the firewall. All the ICMP traffic inbound or outbound can be denied by simply adding a 
rule, but there is no option to restrict specifically ICMP Route Redirect messages for 
example. (See Figure 3)  
Examination on higher layers usually decreases the performance but adds more 
security capability to the system. This is probably the reason behind the decision of the 
EFW developers for not adding a feature to EFW for examining payload of ICMP 
packets. However, since ICMP messages are commonly exploited by hackers, we believe 




Figure 3.   EFW firewall rule adjust window 
 
In contrast to EFW, SPF is able to specify a rule for denying only ICMP Route 
Redirect messages, although it can allow the other kind of ICMP messages to pass 
through the gateway. This helps to prevent an attacker to perform a “man-in-the-middle” 
attack by taking over one of the gateways inside the network. Figure 4 shows the window 
in SPF that is used for specifying firewall rules consisting of different ICMP commands. 
 
 




2. Scanning Test 
NMAP, a common network scanning tool, is used to test if firewalls are capable 
of preventing TCP SYN attacks. NMAP sends a TCP SYN packet to all ports and waits 
for response in order to map out firewall’s rule set.  If a TCP RST comes back from one 
of these ports, this port is supposed to be unfiltered by firewall. If the port is filtered, then 
nothing should come back. Our test showed that both EFW and SPF prevented TCP SYN 
flood or TCP SYN scanning by checking SYN flags in TCP header, which is done 
through higher level filtering rather than simple IP layer filtering. But surprisingly, EFW 
is not able to prevent a TCP ACK packet used for scanning that looks like a reply to a 
request from an internal host. SPF on the other hand, by keeping track of the TCP 
connections, is able to discard the packets that are not related to any connection 
previously established. Table 1 below shows the list of the ports that are open and filtered 
at the EFW client after a scanning by using NMAP. 
 
PORT  STATE SERVICE 
135/tcp Open msrpc 
139/tcp Open Netbios-ssn 
445/tcp Open Microsoft-ds 
1025/tcp Open NFS-or-IIS 
1723/tcp Open Pptp 
5000/tcp Open UPnP 
 
Table 1. List of open ports at the EFW NIC 
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D. PERFORMANCE TESTING 
1. Network Setup  
The components used in this evaluation include EFW clients, an EFW server, and 
the physical connections. Two PC workstations are used to emulate client system 
activities of a typical network. All client PCs are installed with Pentium IV CPU at 2.4 
GHz or above and 256 MB of RAM. Additionally, a PC with Pentium IV CPU at 3 GHz 
and 1GB of RAM is used as the server. It is attached to the Local Area Network (LAN) 
and running the 3COM EFW Policy Server software.  
The workstations for clients and the server are pre-installed with on-board Intel 
PRO/100 VE model NIC (Intel NIC). In addition, 3COM 3CRFW200 and 3CRFW300 
model firewall NIC (3COM NIC) are installed on the clients and the server respectively, 
as required by the EFW setup. Since firewall cards are specially designed for EFW 
system, and they have some specific communication methods and adjustments; Intel 
NICs are used to provide the baseline value to evaluate the 3COM NIC performance.  
They are also used when running application firewall on the host computer in the 
performance evaluation testing. 
 
Figure 5.   Logical network topology used for throughput testing. 
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Figure 5 illustrates the selected physical topology used to conduct throughput 
measurement experimentation on the EFW clients. Two clients are connected via 
Category 5 cable to a 4 port 10/100/1000 megabit layer-2 switch, which in turn is also 
connected to the policy server. One client acts as the transmitter and the other as the 
receiver. The throughput is measured between these two clients. 
The Spirent Smartbits packet generator is also used in our experiment to measure 
packet loss. The packet generator has 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet connection 
[Spirent2003] and is controlled by the same server machine on which the 3COM policy 
server is installed. The packet generator is connected to the server and one of the clients 
using separate Ethernet connections to avoid intervention of control signals with test 
results. As illustrated in Figure 6, the server is directly connected to the packet generator 
via a Category 5 cable, and one of the clients is through an Ethernet switch. The control 
signals of the packet generator are transferred via the direct connection between the 
packet generator and the TCL script running on the server.  
The idea behind isolating the connections between packet generator-policy server 
and policy server-client is to separate the EFW and packet generator system messaging. 
This setup provides a more real world-like environment, where EFW will have the same 
message overload between Policy Server and clients, and there is no packet generator and 
messages between packet generator and the server in the network.   
 
Figure 6.   Logical network topology used for packet loss testing 
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The throughput and packet loss tests are repeated on laptops using an EFW PC 
card as well. The other components and the topology remain the same during testing PC 
cards as the topology used in testing PCI driven EFW cards.  
As explained in Chapter IV Section C, some measurements are taken for EFW 
previously [Burrows2004]. The previous work was only based on performance and 
capabilities of EFW system but did not have any comparison with existing firewall 
systems. In this research, measurements are extended in order to provide a platform for 
comparing EFW with common host-based firewall systems.  
For the performance testing part in this research, EFW is compared with firewall 
applications that have the ability to do packet-filtering. TTCP is used for measuring the 
delay and transmission rate. Since the NIC and firewall setup changes in the test while 
network topology remains the same, TTCP measures the impact of changing the firewall 
system on throughput.  The application firewall used in the test for performance 
comparison is the SPF.  Later on in the analysis we also use the term SPF to reference 
application firewalls in general. 
For the performance phase of testing, we use various workloads on the network to 
compare the throughput of EFW and SPF. A compatible baseline performance value, 
measured when no firewall filtering rule is used, is found in order to determine the base 
configuration for comparative testing.   
2. Throughput Test 
Each client computer has two different kinds of NIC. One is the 3COM 
3CRFW200 model used in EFW system and the other is either an Intel PRO 100/VE or 
3COM 3C920. The throughput performance of a NIC is partially determined by the 
circuit design and quality of semi-conductor and conductors inside. Our goal is to find the 
experimental setting where similar throughput performance is achieved when no firewall 
function is applied, and use this setting to compare the impact of various firewalls on 
performance. Therefore, measurements are taken when no ACL is applied to the firewall 
systems. This is done by disabling the application firewall and disassociating EFW NIC 
with the Policy Server during the test. The throughput is measured by transferring data of 
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different size in fixed-length TCP packets using TTCP for each of the NIC and the results 


























Figure 7.   Baseline throughput (KB/second) of NIC with different sizes of data. 
 
Figure 7 shows the throughput of various NICs when different sized data are 
transferred.  The size of the data transferred using TTCP is calculated by multiplying 
buffer size and the number of buffers sent. The buffer size affects the throughput value 
much more than the number of buffers. That’s why we kept the default value of 2048 as 
the constant number of buffers and changed the buffer size during the experiments. The 
results show that when smaller sized data are transferred, 3COM NIC products do not 
achieve as high a throughput as the integrated Intel NIC.  Burrows and Lemott also 
conducted similar TCP testing for 3COM 3CRFW200 NIC and measured TCP 
throughput by sending a file with the default buffer length of 8 KB. [Burrows2004] 
Although they used PCATTCP, another version of TTCP, the results were exactly the 
same for two studies at 8 KB buffer size. In this test, all NIC reached to maximum 
throughput value 11.5 megabytes per second which is equal to 92 megabits per second 
when the buffer length is 16384 bytes (16 KB), shown as 32MB data size (16KB*2048) 
in Figure 7.   The result is reasonable since the CAT-5 cable used in the test limits the 
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maximum date rate of the system to 100 megabits per second.  The buffer length of 16 
KB and 2048 number of buffers is used in the further testing. 
Burrows and Lemott measured throughput of EFW NIC with constant buffer 
length in the previous study [Burrows2004], and they only turned the firewall on and off 
by assigning a policy to NIC from Policy Server or removing the association between the 
NIC and the Policy Server. However, they didn’t measure the firewall’s rule processing 
affect on the total performance of the system and they didn’t compare EFW system with 
other type of firewall systems. In the next step of testing, we set a platform for comparing 
the throughput of SPF and EFW by using TTCP, and we apply three different sizes of 
rule sets in order to see the performance under different loads, because processing rules 
and the associated action may alter the performance of the firewall. 
Three different policies are created at the policy server of EFW system: Large 
size policy, medium size policy and small size policy. The rule sets for each set of policy 
can be found in Appendix B.  Large size policy consists of 29 rules and default rules such 
as “No IP Spoofing” and “No sniffing” which are already defined in EFW system. 
Medium size policy has only the allow rules that are required for testing by using TCP. 
All the other communication is denied by a general deny rule. However, as mentioned 
Section B, EFW does not give the opportunity to control higher level messages like 
“ICMP echo” or “ICMP reply”, for that reason all ICMP messages are allowed. EFW 
does not allow deactivating all rules at a particular time.  At least one default rule for 
denying or allowing any type of connection is needed in every policy created. Therefore 
the small size policy has just a general allow rule, which can be assumed as the firewall 
does not have any rule at all. But, it should not be ignored that firewall is still spending 
time accessing data even though it is not making too much decisions at this time. 
Firewalls running on application layer are able to monitor OS behaviors and 
detect which application is trying to reach network.  Since SPF is a firewall that is able to 
work on application level, more care is given in defining the rule set in order to keep the 
comparison fair. The same policies are applied to SPF by using the “system-wide 
settings” feature. The rules defined in this area are applied to all applications accessing to 
network and all data coming from the network as it is in the EFW system. Although SPF 
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gives opportunity to define rules specific to applications and protocols such as ICMP, 
these rules are disabled in the test.  
As EFW is using 3COM NIC for performing firewall tasks, and this NIC has 
specifications special to EFW system such as sending heartbeat data in a period of time to 
keep in touch with policy server, the data is sent through Intel NIC when SPF 
performance is measured. Since previous test shows that when TTCP sends 16KB of 
buffer size, the throughput of the Intel and 3COM NIC are compatible,  16KB of buffer 

























Figure 8.   Throughput (KB/second) of EFW when different sizes of rule sets are 
applied. 
 
Table 4 in Appendix A shows the throughput results taken from the tests.  Figure 8 
summarizes the results.  It shows the average throughputs measured when different sized 
rule sets are applied.  The result indicates that EFW performance is not affected very 
much by the size of policy rules.  Maximum standard deviation is in small rule set size 
and it is as low as 0.96 KB/second.   In fact, when the same rule sets are applied to SPF, 
the  performance  is  very  similar  to  those above except that SPF’s performance results 
38 
 
have more variation.  This implies that for the size of the rule set we chose, the size 
variation does not affect firewall performance with today’s powerful computing 
resources.   
3. Off-loading Test 
To perform packet filtering, firewalls must examine each packet; classify the 
packet based on the rule set, and carry out the actions defined by the rule set. This can be 
a very computational intensive task for the processor depending on the rule set and the 
amount of traffic.   
A more expensive computation task is cryptographic process. Encryption and 
decryption of the packets takes a lot of system resources. IPSEC is a cryptographic 
protocol for securing IP packets at networking layer. A firewall has to encrypt every 
IPSEC packet before examining it. EFW NICs has an embedded CPU for decrypting 
IPSEC packets. 3COM claims that EFW off-loading mechanism to take the cryptographic 
load of IPSEC protocol away from the host computer CPU and decrypt the packet before 
it ever reaches the upper level of software firewall mechanism. [3Com2004] 
For testing part of the EFW performance when IPSEC is enforced, MMC feature 
of Windows XP Professional is used to set IPSEC connection between two workstations.  
3DES and SHA1 algorithms are selected for encryption and integrity respectively. Both 
transceiver and receiver side save a pre-shared secure key for authentication.  
TTCP application is used to obtain throughput measurements. The same buffer 
length of 16KB that used in baseline throughput test is used for off-loading test. Table 6 
in Appendix A and Figure 9 below shows the throughput data collected from both 
firewall systems. The bars on the left part of the diagram that are labeled “w/IPSEC” 
demonstrates the previous throughput measurements whereas the bars on the right shows 
the throughput of EFW and SPF systems when IPSEC is enforced as the encryption 



























Figure 9.   Throughput (KB/second) of firewall systems when IPSEC is enforced. 
 
Results in Figure 9 show that EFW is able to get 75.31% of the throughput when 
IPSEC is enforced, where SPF is able to get 50.05% only. EFW off load mechanism 
helps to get approximately 25% more of throughput by taking the encryption and 
decryption work from CPU located at host to the CPU embedded on the NIC.  
4. Frame Loss Test 
In addition to measuring the maximum throughput a firewall system can sustain, 
frame loss tests are also carried out to determine at what load the NIC processing can 
become a bottleneck and cause frame loss.  The frame loss may occur because of 
different reasons. The most common reasons are listed below: 
• Congestion in the network 
• Latency during packet transmission 
• Out of sequence packets 
• Frame errors  
For frame loss analysis, Smartbits packet generator is connected to the layer-2 
switch and ICMP echo packets are sent to the EFW client. Based on the ICMP reply 
packets returned from the client, the percentage of packet loss is calculated with different 
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traffic loads. In our test, out of sequence packets are not expected since we are not using 
any routing, i.e. all packets have to go through the same switch. Congestion may be 
occurring when ICMP echo and reply messages collide. Latency and frame errors are the 
most probable reasons for frame loss in our case, and these two parameters directly affect 
the performance of firewalls.  Testing is conducted by using a script written in TCL 
provided by Spirent Communications. [Spirent2001] The script runs in 3 phases 
including sample iteration, transmitting flows and analyze data for calculating No Drop 
Point (NDP), which gives us the maximum throughput percentage achieved before any 
frame loss occur. A larger NDP indicates a more desirable firewall performance.  Figure 




































Figure 10.   Script flow chart 
 
In the sample iteration phase of the test (see Figure 11), regular ICMP packets are 
sent to check if the client will replay correctly.  In the next iteration, Cyclic Redundancy 
Check (CRC) error is added into the ICMP packets to test if the client will drop the 
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packets. Finally, undersize and oversize packets are sent to check the correctness of the 
clients reply. Results indicate that EFW NIC is dropping all faulty packets including over 
sized ones.  
When the sample iteration is finished, packet generator started to transmit packets 
in form of a flow. Utilization in the network (i.e. percentage of the bandwidth used) is 
started at 10% and is increased by 10 percent for each iteration.  The percentage of the 
packets received is calculated, and this value is called throughput in the frame loss test 
result. The packet size is changed between 64, 128 and 1024 bytes and different policies 
applied with different rule set sizes while these measurements are taken. Similar to data 
size in the throughput test done with TCP packets, rule set size didn’t affect the results 
much. However, the packet size has more influence on the results. Figure 11 shows the 
maximum throughput percentages achieved for EFW system in sample iteration phase for 
















Figure 11.   NDP values of EFW under different loads using 64 bytes ICMP packets 
and large size policy applied  
 
The results demonstrate that EFW starts to loss packets after 10% utilization is 
reached. To find the NDP, the exact point at which the system starts to experience packet 
loss, the TCL script performs a binary search. When all packets are successfully 
transferred, it is assumed that test is passed and the network load is increased; otherwise, 
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the load is decreased. If the difference between previous and current network load (delta) 
is less than 0.2 percent, the test is ended, and network load value (measured in percentage 
of bandwidth utilization) is recorded as the NDP.  
In the test, the exact NDP value found is 11.71% for EFW system. The same test 
phases are also applied to SPF system, with the same packet sizes. Figure 12 shows the 
calculated NDP of EFW and SPF systems with different ICMP packet sizes. The data 



























Figure 12.   NDP of EFW and SPF with ICMP 
 
Results in Figure 12 shows that SPF has larger NDP than EFW in smaller packet 
sizes. However, as the packet size increases EFW gains more portion of available 
bandwidth.  
Since there is a possibility that some of NIC may not response every ICMP echo 
request after a limit is exceeded [Spirent2001], packet loss test is executed with UDP as 
well. A UDP server is set up at the EFW client with the purpose of sending back the UDP 
packets back to packet generator. The results show that EFW NIC is probably limiting 
the responses to ICMP echo requests indeed because its packet loss rate is much less with 





























Figure 13.   Maximum throughput percentage achieved before any packet loss with 
UDP 
5. Roaming Test 
Packet loss test is repeated with the laptop using an EFW PC card, or “roaming 
device” by 3COM definition. EFW system has two types of PC cards with firewall 
capability that may be plugged into a laptop: 3COM 3CRFW102 and 3RFW103. 
3CRFW102 is using an interface cable for Ethernet whereas 3CRFW103 can accept an 
Ethernet connection via the port embedded to NIC.  
Two laptops are used as EFW clients in roaming test experiment: A Dell Inspiron 
5100 with Pentium IV at 2.8 GHz and 384 MB RAM. An IBM Think Pad with Pentium 
IV at 2.2 GHz and 256 MB RAM. Windows XP Professional Service Pack 1 is installed 
on each laptop. IBM laptop has an integrated Intel PRC 100/VE NIC, the same model 
used in comparison of desktop NIC.  
TTCP test is performed on the roaming NIC in order to find baseline throughput. 
No ACL rule is defined in application firewall and EFW NIC is not associated with 
Policy Server. Figure 14 shows the baseline TCP throughput results of roaming NIC and 



























Figure 14.   Baseline throughput (KB/sec) of roaming NIC 
 
Results in the Figure 14 imply that 3CRFW102 and 3RFW103 NIC reach their 
maximum throughput at larger buffer lengths. The results are similar to the results of 
stationary NIC shown earlier in Figure 7.   
Also, TCP throughput tests performed on roaming devices. Similar to throughput 
tests with stationary NICs, Intel NIC is used with SPF in order to have a more realistic 
comparison platform. The results show that throughput of roaming devices are not as 
high as the integrated Intel NIC. The standard deviation of the results is 1207 KB/second 
whereas the standard deviation for the stationary devices is 0.96 KB/second. PC card 
interface used in roaming devices is probably primary reason of throughput loss and 
increase in the variance. Figure 15 below shows the results of roaming device throughput 

























Figure 15.   Throughput (KB/second) of roaming devices 
 
The same frame loss test applied to stationary EFW NIC via Smartbits packet 
generator is applied to EFW with 3RFW102 NIC as well. Integrated Intel NIC is used for 
SPF system. Large size policy is applied to both EFW and SPF. The packet size changed 
between 64 and 1024 bytes. The test is performed with both ICMP and UDP packets. 
NDP of EFW NIC and Intel NIC are calculated by using TCL script. Figure 16 and 17 
below shows the frame loss test results of roaming devices.  
The NDP values from frame loss test with roaming devices is similar to stationary 
EFW devices when ICMP is used, whereas NDP values obtained by using UDP are 
significantly less than stationary EFW devices. However, EFW has larger NDP values 






































Figure 17.   NDP of EFW and SPF of roaming NIC with UDP 
 
E. ANALYSIS 
EFW is a good beginning for the new generation firewall systems. First of all, 
embedding the firewall mechanism into the NIC makes it more difficult for an attacker to 
disable the firewall without physical access to hardware. Performing encryption and 
decryption process in hardware improves the performance of firewall system especially 
in highly cryptography involved connections such as IPSEC. Performance of EFW is 
very good even under heavy load network conditions. Table 2 demonstrates performance 
test results of EFW as compared to SPF, a representative of the current host-based 
application layer firewalls. Throughput values are based on TTCP application with 8192 
bytes buffer size, and frame loss values are measured via Smartbits packet generator with 
1024 bytes frame size. 
However, the implementation of 3COM has some limitations. EFW does not have 
capability to keep track of connections established, so that it does not provide advantages 
of a stateful firewall.  Furthermore, it does not provide some features in today’s software 
oriented firewalls such as SPF, which are capable of performing filtering at higher layers 





Table 2. Performance test results of EFW and SPF systems 




TCP IPSEC ICMP UDP 
EFW 11554.30 KB/sec 8702.49 KB/sec 93.35 % 79.10 % 
SPF 11484.93 KB/sec 5748.81 KB/sec 50.19 % 50.19 % 
 
Even though EFW is integrated well with Windows OS and TCP/IP, there is no 
support for other OS and networking protocols at the moment. The dependency on 
Windows limits the scalability of EFW in networks running servers on other types of OS. 
Enterprise networks using other protocols than TCP/IP cannot depend on EFW as the 
firewall solution.  
 Network-based firewalls, serving on layer 2 and 3 in OSI model, can be used 
effectively with other OS and networking protocols. They still have advantage in 
performance because processing at lower layers can be done faster than processing at 
higher layers. Except the ones installed on the routers, network based firewalls generally 
have a whole hardware system dedicated to only firewall process that increase their 
performance as well. The network-based firewalls have a disadvantage due to their 
location in the network security architecture.  A large amount of traffic passing through 
the firewall may cause firewall to become the bottleneck of the network performance. 
Therefore, adding EFW to the network security system may reduce the amount of traffic 
passing through the network-based firewall and prevent it from becoming the single point 
of failure in case of a DOS attack.  
 EFW system serves on the transport layer and is able to examine the packets in 
more detail. The key advantage of the EFW system is its ability to prevent insider attacks. 
The performance of the EFW is very good particularly in high-crypto connections and 
reasonable at standard connections. The main disadvantage of EFW system is the lack of 
recollection mechanism for dynamically tracking the connections established. An 
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application firewall used with EFW system concurrently will maximize the security 
utilities and performance in firewall architecture.  
 Application firewalls are the most security capable firewalls because their 
filtering can be specified at the highest layer in the OSI model. Some of the application 
firewalls also have IDS capabilities so they can address more sophisticated attacks. Since, 
application firewalls are based on software rather than hardware, their performance is 
weaker than other firewall systems. Carefully defining the ACL of an application firewall 
is the best solution for getting highest benefit from its security utilities.  
Table 3 below compares the security capabilities of network-based and host-based 
firewalls including EFW. 
 
Table 3. Security capabilities of firewall systems 
Firewall System Filtering layer Recollection Location 
Network-based FW Network (layer 3) No Network gateway 
EFW Transport (layer 4) No Host NIC 
Application FW Application (layer7) Yes Host 
 
Defense-in-depth approach is gaining more support as security concept of modern 
networking. The idea behind this concept is relying on the intelligent application of 
techniques that exist today. The strategy followed suggests having a balance between the 
protection and cost.  
The EFW system can play an important role in a defense-in-depth 
implementation. Application firewalls such as SPF and IDS applications can be used 
together with EFW. Such a configuration merges the performance advantage of EFW in 
crypto-heavy connections especially and security capabilities of software-based security 
systems. Both insider and outsider threats will be addressed in this implementation. The 
application firewall will not add a large amount of cost to the EFW system. In this 
research performance of such a configuration consisted of SPF and EFW is tested. 
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Results of the test indicate that SPF does not affect the performance gained with EFW 
NIC in average. Figure 18 below shows the packet loss test results. There are three bars 
showing the NDPs of SPF, EFW and EFW-SPF configurations from left to right 
respectively. In the EFW-SPF configuration EFW NIC is used and the large policy rules 


















Figure 18.   Packet loss percentage of EFW and SPF systems 
 
Besides an application firewall, a network-based firewall may also be used in 
implementing a defense-in-depth strategy. Network based firewalls will work faster 
because they do not examine data above layer 3 of the OSI model. Since most of the 
network protocols accommodated by using layer 3 and below, network-based firewalls 
can be used nearly at any type of networks. [Wack2002] An EFW protected network may 
share network-based firewall with an Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) network for 
example.  
In such a configuration consisting of three firewall systems (application firewall, 
EFW and network-based firewall) filtering task will be divided among the firewalls. A 
network-based firewall sitting on the gateway router can block certain type of attacks, 
possibly filter unwanted protocols, perform simple access control and then pass the traffic 
onto EFW and application firewalls which will examine higher layers of the OSI stack. 
The performance of the network-based firewall will be high unless it becomes the 
bottleneck due to large amount of traffic as we discussed previously. The performance on 
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the hosts will be less compared to gateway, but smaller size of the traffic per host will 






























Figure 19.   OSI stack coverage of firewall systems 
 
Additionally, some extra adjustment needed in order to let EFW keep its self-
control mechanism operational in an integrated configuration with other firewall systems. 
Two ports (2081, 2082) are used mainly between Policy Server and EFW client 
applications in order to change policy and configuration information. Application 
firewalls should let these ports to be used by EFW. If Policy Server and Management 
Console are at different sides of a network-based firewall, they need to use three more 
TCP ports in order to maintain connection (2072, 2073, and 2074). At that point, using 
proxies seems like a good security point.  
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Configuration of EFW in such an integrated firewall environment depends on 
multiple factors: size of the network to be protected, amount of traffic, sensitivity of the 
data etc. A small-scale network without much number of servers may have one Policy 
Server and EFW clients as many as needed, staying in the recommended limit of 1000 
per Policy Server. Based on the expected traffic load, a small-scale network may have a 
gateway router with a built-in firewall, which will decrease cost of having standalone 
firewall hardware. EFW clients may have an additional application firewall such as SPF 
in order to increase layer of filtering, and an IDS as well. Figure 20 below presents an 
example EFW configuration for a small-scale network. 
 
Figure 20.   An example of a small-scale EFW configuration 
 
A large-scale network configuration would probably need multiple EFW domains. 
Having multiple domains controlled by different Policy Servers will provide advantage of 
assigning different policies according to data sensitivity and threat probability in the 
particular domain. If the amount of the traffic is as large as the size of the network or if 
there are multiple sub-networks using other protocols than TCP/IP, a dedicated layer 2 or 
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3 hardware firewall may be installed at the gateway of the network for increasing 
performance. Application firewalls and IDSs should be in the configuration to address 
other security gaps as well.  However, one should not ignore that the more the 
configuration gets complex the more the possibility of configuration-fault increases. 
Firewall management is as important as implementation of the firewall system, as it is for 
the other security systems. Figure 21 shows an example EFW deployment in a large-scale 
network. Domain B, having a database server, will need a more restricted policy than 
domain A in the example configuration. Web Server is left out of any domain in order to 
prevent decrease in the performance as if it is in a DMZ. 
Besides the management of complex firewall deployments, evaluating these 
configurations is very time and effort consuming. Parameters and factors for evaluation 
EFW in this research are selected based on assumption that EFW is a host-based firewall 
so that traffic passing through it is for only one PC. However, evaluating a network-based 
firewall will need to examine more factors, and an integrated firewall configuration will 
need even much more. “Concurrent TCP connection capacity” is one factor suggested in 
RFC 3511, that we don’t think important for a host-based firewall. For a network based 
firewall protecting several web servers however, even “TCP tear down time” is an 
important factor if you imagine the number of HTTP requests dropped during the tear 
down time at a rush hour. The list of recommended factors in RFC 3511 may be found at 
































In this research EFW system is evaluated by testing it in a network environment 
set up at the Naval Postgraduate School Advanced Network Laboratory. EFW is a newly 
developed host-based firewall system that has a solution for one of the most important 
limitations of firewalls, preventing insider attacks. The research followed the 
methodology and standardization offered for firewall performance analysis by RFC 2647 
and RFC 3511, when applicable.  
 Firewalls are naturally changing due to the needs emerging from newly 
discovered vulnerabilities and threats. One of these threats that challenge the old 
fashioned firewalls is the possibility of attack from the inside. Lately developed firewall 
systems have software components located at hosts of the network in order to solve 
insider attack problem. However managing a complex software firewall system is a 
difficult task. Moreover, putting all these functionalities into one security system 
generates trade-off between functionality and performance. 
 EFW is proposed as a combination of host-based and hardware firewalls that 
merge advantages of two firewall systems. The architecture of EFW is consisted of four 
main components. These are the Policy Server, the Management Console, EFW devices 
and the domain that contains one or more of other components. Policy Servers 
communicate with clients who have EFW devices to exchange information related to 
firewall operations.   
 Previous study of EFW done at NPS [Burrows2004] has shown some 
vulnerability and performance characteristics of the current EFW system.  In this 
research, we extended previous work in both performance and security testing. EFW 
system is compared with SPF as a representative of application firewall systems. The 
security testing aims to find vulnerabilities during attempts to penetrate the system 
whereas the performance testing defines the parameters, factors and metrics that are 
important to the system.  
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Scanning performed via NMAP in security tests show that EFW is able to prevent 
TCP SYN flood and port scans, which needs transport layer filtering capability. 
However, additional result show that EFW does leave some ports open for NMAP scan, 
confirming that EFW does not keeps track of states of the connections, thus not a stateful 
firewall. On the other hand, SPF is able to discard any packet that is not related with a 
previously established connection. 
 An important feature of firewalls is the layer that they are able to do filtering. 
During security testing we tested that EFW does the filtering at transport layer, EFW 
cannot perform filtering beyond IP header, e.g. at the application layer. SPF looks inside 
the payload of the packets and decides whether it should let packet to pass through based 
on the related application’s privileges.  
Throughput tests in performance testing indicate that performance of EFW and 
SPF is very close during normal traffic, except that SPF throughput results have more 
variation. However, EFW has a significant throughput advantage in IPSEC connection. 
Off-loading mechanism helps to get approximately 25% more throughput by taking the 
encryption and decryption work from the host CPU. 
 Throughput results also indicate that the number of the rules in ACL does not 
affect performance of the firewalls with today’s powerful computing resources. Most of 
the firewall ACL has no more than a hundred rules. Access of firewall to data inside of an 
IP packet takes a sensible time. However, after reading header information, a linear 
process of comparing particular fields with less than a hundreds of ACL rules does not 
take much time. Therefore, access time has more effect than process time on performance 
of a firewall.  
Frame loss tests performed via Smartbits packet generator illustrate performance 
of EFW significantly better than application firewalls when traffic gets heavy in the 
network. Contrary to ACL size, the average frame size affects firewall performance 
considerably. Larger packet size in average leads to better performance. Frame loss test 
results also indicate that EFW is probably limiting the responses to ICMP echo request 
bursts. As a result, using UDP in frame loss tests provides more accurate results.  
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 EFW system has special NIC for different platforms. PC card NIC, defined as 
roaming device in EFW system, is used for laptops that can be integrated into an EFW 
protected network. TTCP throughput and Smartbits frame loss tests show that roaming 
devices has similar performance to the stationary EFW devices.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
Our analysis demonstrates that performance and security trade-off between 
firewall systems still holds its important effect in design principles. We propose to 
integrate EFW system with network-based firewalls and application firewalls, in a 
defense-in-depth scheme. One should note that EFW system’s key advantage on such 
integration is ability to address insider attacks. However, EFW system has a couple of 
weaknesses that needs to be reviewed before taking place in the configurations which we 
proposed. Configuration of EFW in such an integrated deployment will be based on 
different factors. Some important factors are size of the network, amount of traffic and 
sensitivity of data.  
Based on the analysis we did, there are still needs for further study on how to 
create a best network configuration that maximizes the utility, performance and resistance 
to insider attacks. A firewall configuration including a network-based firewall will have 
to protect some servers besides client computers. Latency distribution over time and 
support of different connection types are among the important parameters for servers. A 
network-based firewall should not be a bottleneck for server traffic through the networks.  
Therefore, more factors such as the number of possible concurrent connections and 
connection establishment / tear down rate should be considered when evaluating such an 
integrated firewall system.  
Traffic generated on higher layers of the OSI model will not be appropriate for 
measuring the network-based firewall performance. Performance analysis software 
applications are appropriate for measuring firewalls working at higher layers. We used 
TTCP as the network performance analysis application in this research. TTCP use 
transport layer protocols TCP and UDP to measure the throughput of DUT/SUT. 
Smartbits hardware based packet generator used for packet loss tests will be more 
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effective in measuring the performance at lower layers in the OSI model. Additionally, 
using a hardware packet generator will provide a wider platform to compare different 




APPENDIX A. STATISTICS DATA 
Table 4. TCP throughput (KB/sec) results of NIC via TTCP  
 Stationary Roaming 
Buffer length Intel  3Com200 3Com920 Intel  3Com102 3Com103 
256 10893.62 8258.6 8258.6 8258.06 4096 4697.25 
512 10893.62 9394.5 8192 8192 4697.25 4357.45 
1024 10951.87 8192 8192 7728.3 4231.4 6243.9 
2048 11409.47 7937.98 7937.98 8192 4371.4 6496.43 
4096 11393.6 8062.99 7824.26 8192 6099.78 6633.2 
8192 11521.8 8003.91 8003.91 8253.9 7945.68 8003.91 
16384 11461.35 11461.35 11521.8 11461.35 10224.02 10701.5 





Table 5. TCP throughput (KB/second) with different size of rule sets applied. 
 EFW SPF 
RUN Small  Medium  Large Small Medium Large 
Run1 11554.3 11554.3 11554.3 11529.91 11521.8 11521.8 
Run2 11554.3 11554.3 11554.3 11652.92 11521.8 11401.53 
Run3 11554.3 11554.3 11554.3 11652.92 11521.8 11521.8 
Run4 11554.3 11554.3 11554.3 11521.8 11529.91 11401.53 
Run5 11554.3 11554.3 11554.3 11521.8 11393.6 11521.8 
Run6 11554.3 11554.3 11554.3 11521.8 11521.8 11393.6 
Run7 11554.3 11554.3 11554.3 11521.8 11521.8 11521.8 
Run8 11556.34 11554.3 11554.3 11521.8 11521.8 11521.8 
Run9 11556.34 11554.3 11554.3 11521.8 11521.8 11521.8 
Run10 11556.34 11554.3 11554.3 11521.8 11521.8 11521.8 
Average 11554.91 11554.3 11554.3 11548.84 11509.79 11484.93 











Table 6. Throughput (KB/seconds) of firewalls with IPSEC  
SPF EFW 
RUN 
w/ IPSEC w/o IPSEC w/ IPSEC w/o IPSEC 
Run1 11521.8 5992.68 11554.3 8289.4 
Run2 11401.53 5957.82 11554.3 8702.16 
Run3 11521.8 4923.08 11554.3 8701.01 
Run4 11401.53 5992.68 11554.3 8756.81 
Run5 11521.8 5957.82 11554.3 8738.13 
Run6 11393.6 4899.52 11554.3 8720.69 
Run7 11521.8 5925.5 11554.3 8793.24 
Run8 11521.8 5923.36 11554.3 8774.4 
Run9 11521.8 5957.82 11554.3 8738.13 
Run10 11521.8 5957.82 11554.3 8810.97 






































64 14204 965872 10 42612 42721 2897616 2905028 100.26 
64 28409 1931812 20 85227 50833 5795436 3456644 59.64 
64 42662 2901016 30 127986 51927 8703048 3531036 40.57 
64 56818 3863624 40 170454 52833 11590872 3592644 31 
64 71022 4829496 50 213066 53951 14488488 3668668 25.32 
64 85616 5821888 60 256848 3860 17465664 262480 1.5 
64 100000 6800000 70 300000 634 20400000 43112 0.21 
64 113636 7727248 80 340908 630 23181744 42840 0.18 
64 128865 8762820 90 386595 581 26288460 39508 0.15 
64 142045 9659060 100 426135 674 28977180 45832 0.16 
256 4464 1160640 10 13392 13542 3481920 3520920 101.12 
256 8928 2321280 20 26784 26784 6963840 6963840 100 
256 13397 3483220 30 40191 41635 10449660 10825100 103.59 
256 17857 4642820 40 53571 45860 13928460 11923600 85.61 
256 22321 5803460 50 66963 45053 17410380 11713780 67.28 
256 26824 6974240 60 80472 44801 20922720 11648260 55.67 
256 31250 8125000 70 93750 44837 24375000 11657620 47.83 
256 35714 9285640 80 107142 3000 27856920 780000 2.8 
256 40192 10449920 90 120576 171 31349760 44460 0.14 
256 44642 11606920 100 133926 276 34820760 71760 0.21 
63 
 
1024 1192 1225376 10 3576 3581 3676128 3681268 100.14 
1024 2385 2451780 20 7155 7177 7355340 7377956 100.31 
1024 3578 3678184 30 10734 10763 11034552 11064364 100.27 
1024 4770 4903560 40 14310 14368 14710680 14770304 100.41 
1024 5963 6129964 50 17889 17889 18389892 18389892 100 
1024 7159 7359452 60 21477 21477 22078356 22078356 100 
1024 8350 8583800 70 25050 25050 25751400 25751400 100 
1024 9541 9808148 80 28623 28623 29424444 29424444 100 
1024 10738 11038664 90 32214 32215 33115992 33117020 100 




































64 14204 965872 10 42612 42612 2897616 2897616 100 
64 28409 1931812 20 85227 49065 5795436 3336420 57.57 
64 42662 2901016 30 127986 50127 8703048 3408636 39.17 
64 56818 3863624 40 170454 51081 11590872 3473508 29.97 
64 71022 4829496 50 213066 52152 14488488 3546336 24.48 
64 85616 5821888 60 256848 3846 17465664 261528 1.5 
64 100000 6800000 70 300000 641 20400000 43588 0.21 
64 113636 7727248 80 340908 609 23181744 41412 0.18 
64 128865 8762820 90 386595 593 26288460 40324 0.15 
64 142045 9659060 100 426135 668 28977180 45424 0.16 
256 4464 1160640 10 13392 13549 3481920 3522740 101.17 
256 8928 2321280 20 26784 26784 6963840 6963840 100 
256 13397 3483220 30 40191 41372 10449660 10756720 102.94 
256 17857 4642820 40 53571 44447 13928460 11556220 82.97 
256 22321 5803460 50 66963 43760 17410380 11377600 65.35 
256 26824 6974240 60 80472 43323 20922720 11263980 53.84 
256 31250 8125000 70 93750 43364 24375000 11274640 46.25 
256 35714 9285640 80 107142 3073 27856920 798980 2.87 
256 40192 10449920 90 120576 233 31349760 60580 0.19 
256 44642 11606920 100 133926 274 34820760 71240 0.2 
1024 1192 1225376 10 3576 3581 3676128 3681268 100.14 
65 
 
1024 2385 2451780 20 7155 7195 7355340 7396460 100.56 
1024 3578 3678184 30 10734 10802 11034552 11104456 100.63 
1024 4770 4903560 40 14310 14359 14710680 14761052 100.34 
1024 5963 6129964 50 17889 17889 18389892 18389892 100 
1024 7159 7359452 60 21477 21477 22078356 22078356 100 
1024 8350 8583800 70 25050 25050 25751400 25751400 100 
1024 9541 9808148 80 28623 28369 29424444 29163332 99.11 
1024 10738 11038664 90 32214 28529 33115992 29327812 88.56 













































64 14204 965872 10 42612 42613 2897616 2897684 100 
64 28409 1931812 20 85227 82323 5795436 5597964 96.59 
64 42662 2901016 30 127986 86702 8703048 5895736 67.74 
64 56818 3863624 40 170454 88895 11590872 6044860 52.15 
64 71022 4829496 50 213066 90307 14488488 6140876 42.38 
64 85616 5821888 60 256848 257833 17465664 17532644 100.38 
64 100000 6800000 70 300000 1304 20400000 88672 0.43 
64 113636 7727248 80 340908 1304 23181744 88672 0.38 
64 128865 8762820 90 386595 1305 26288460 88740 0.34 
64 142045 9659060 100 426135 1305 28977180 88740 0.31 
256 4464 1160640 10 13392 13392 3481920 3481920 100 
256 8928 2321280 20 26784 26784 6963840 6963840 100 
256 13397 3483220 30 40191 40377 10449660 10498020 100.46 
256 17857 4642820 40 53571 53590 13928460 13933400 100.04 
256 22321 5803460 50 66963 66653 17410380 17329780 99.54 
256 26824 6974240 60 80472 68816 20922720 17892160 85.52 
256 31250 8125000 70 93750 70170 24375000 18244200 74.85 
256 35714 9285640 80 107142 13340 27856920 3468400 12.45 
256 40192 10449920 90 120576 1120 31349760 291200 0.93 
256 44642 11606920 100 133926 1130 34820760 293800 0.84 
67 
 
1024 1192 1225376 10 3576 3576 3676128 3676128 100 
1024 2385 2451780 20 7155 7160 7355340 7360480 100.07 
1024 3578 3678184 30 10734 10734 11034552 11034552 100 
1024 4770 4903560 40 14310 14310 14710680 14710680 100 
1024 5963 6129964 50 17889 17889 18389892 18389892 100 
1024 7159 7359452 60 21477 3411 22078356 3506508 15.88 
1024 8350 8583800 70 25050 3488 25751400 3585664 13.92 
1024 9541 9808148 80 28623 3431 29424444 3527068 11.99 
1024 10738 11038664 90 32214 3513 33115992 3611364 10.91 

















































64 14204 965872 10 42612 15224 2897616 1035232 35.73 
64 28409 1931812 20 85227 12554 5795436 853672 14.73 
64 42662 2901016 30 127986 15195 8703048 1033260 11.87 
64 56818 3863624 40 170454 13791 11590872 937788 8.09 
64 71022 4829496 50 213066 13998 14488488 951864 6.57 
64 85616 5821888 60 256848 254967 17465664 17337756 99.27 
64 100000 6800000 70 300000 1838 20400000 124984 0.61 
64 113636 7727248 80 340908 1680 23181744 114240 0.49 
64 128865 8762820 90 386595 922 26288460 62696 0.24 
64 142045 9659060 100 426135 1165 28977180 79220 0.27 
256 4464 1160640 10 13392 13392 3481920 3481920 100 
256 8928 2321280 20 26784 20424 6963840 5310240 76.25 
256 13397 3483220 30 40191 11948 10449660 3106480 29.73 
256 17857 4642820 40 53571 7683 13928460 1997580 14.34 
256 22321 5803460 50 66963 6154 17410380 1600040 9.19 
256 26824 6974240 60 80472 6949 20922720 1806740 8.64 
256 31250 8125000 70 93750 6359 24375000 1653340 6.78 
256 35714 9285640 80 107142 105713 27856920 27485380 98.67 
256 40192 10449920 90 120576 159 31349760 41340 0.13 
256 44642 11606920 100 133926 243 34820760 63180 0.18 
1024 1192 1225376 10 3576 3576 3676128 3676128 100 
69 
 
1024 2385 2451780 20 7155 7155 7355340 7355340 100 
1024 3578 3678184 30 10734 10734 11034552 11034552 100 
1024 4770 4903560 40 14310 14310 14710680 14710680 100 
1024 5963 6129964 50 17889 17889 18389892 18389892 100 
1024 7159 7359452 60 21477 2500 22078356 2570000 11.64 
1024 8350 8583800 70 25050 2518 25751400 2588504 10.05 
1024 9541 9808148 80 28623 2467 29424444 2536076 8.62 
1024 10738 11038664 90 32214 2447 33115992 2515516 7.6 










































64 14204 965872 10 42612 42883 2897616 2916044 100.64 
64 28409 1931812 20 85227 45014 5795436 3060952 52.82 
64 42662 2901016 30 127986 47701 8703048 3243668 37.27 
64 56818 3863624 40 170454 48687 11590872 3310716 28.56 
64 71022 4829496 50 213066 49656 14488488 3376608 23.31 
64 85616 5821888 60 256848 3942 17465664 268056 1.53 
64 100000 6800000 70 300000 634 20400000 43112 0.21 
64 113636 7727248 80 340908 617 23181744 41956 0.18 
64 128865 8762820 90 386595 613 26288460 41684 0.16 
64 142045 9659060 100 426135 665 28977180 45220 0.16 
256 4464 1160640 10 13392 13530 3481920 3517800 101.03 
256 8928 2321280 20 26784 26784 6963840 6963840 100 
256 13397 3483220 30 40191 41694 10449660 10840440 103.74 
256 17857 4642820 40 53571 42075 13928460 10939500 78.54 
256 22321 5803460 50 66963 41703 17410380 10842780 62.28 
256 26824 6974240 60 80472 41017 20922720 10664420 50.97 
256 31250 8125000 70 93750 41083 24375000 10681580 43.82 
256 35714 9285640 80 107142 3101 27856920 806260 2.89 
256 40192 10449920 90 120576 197 31349760 51220 0.16 
256 44642 11606920 100 133926 270 34820760 70200 0.2 
71 
 
1024 1192 1225376 10 3576 3583 3676128 3683324 100.2 
1024 2385 2451780 20 7155 7157 7355340 7357396 100.03 
1024 3578 3678184 30 10734 10765 11034552 11066420 100.29 
1024 4770 4903560 40 14310 14313 14710680 14713764 100.02 
1024 5963 6129964 50 17889 17889 18389892 18389892 100 
1024 7159 7359452 60 21477 21477 22078356 22078356 100 
1024 8350 8583800 70 25050 25050 25751400 25751400 100 
1024 9541 9808148 80 28623 28624 29424444 29425472 100 
1024 10738 11038664 90 32214 32200 33115992 33101600 99.96 

















































64 14204 965872 10 42612 2822 2897616 191896 6.62 
64 28409 1931812 20 85227 374 5795436 25432 0.44 
64 42662 2901016 30 127986 374 8703048 25432 0.29 
64 56818 3863624 40 170454 374 11590872 25432 0.22 
64 71022 4829496 50 213066 374 14488488 25432 0.18 
64 85616 5821888 60 256848 374 17465664 25432 0.15 
64 100000 6800000 70 300000 374 20400000 25432 0.12 
64 113636 7727248 80 340908 374 23181744 25432 0.11 
64 128865 8762820 90 386595 374 26288460 25432 0.1 
64 142045 9659060 100 426135 374 28977180 25432 0.09 
256 4464 1160640 10 13392 13470 3481920 3502200 100.58 
256 8928 2321280 20 26784 7748 6963840 2014480 28.93 
256 13397 3483220 30 40191 2787 10449660 724620 6.93 
256 17857 4642820 40 53571 40 13928460 10400 0.07 
256 22321 5803460 50 66963 40 17410380 10400 0.06 
256 26824 6974240 60 80472 40 20922720 10400 0.05 
256 31250 8125000 70 93750 40 24375000 10400 0.04 
256 35714 9285640 80 107142 40 27856920 10400 0.04 
256 40192 10449920 90 120576 40 31349760 10400 0.03 
256 44642 11606920 100 133926 40 34820760 10400 0.03 
1024 1192 1225376 10 3576 3582 3676128 3682296 100.17 
73 
 
1024 2385 2451780 20 7155 7161 7355340 7361508 100.08 
1024 3578 3678184 30 10734 10728 11034552 11028384 99.94 
1024 4770 4903560 40 14310 12214 14710680 12555992 85.35 
1024 5963 6129964 50 17889 7545 18389892 7756260 42.18 
1024 7159 7359452 60 21477 10091 22078356 10373548 46.99 
1024 8350 8583800 70 25050 7969 25751400 8192132 31.81 
1024 9541 9808148 80 28623 10 29424444 10280 0.03 
1024 10738 11038664 90 32214 10 33115992 10280 0.03 





































ICMP 64 1133288 11.71875 49998 3399864 3399864 100 
ICMP 256 4037020 34.76563 46581 12111060 12703080 104.89 
ICMP 1024 11451920 93.35938 33420 34355760 34391740 100.1 
UDP 64 1075896 11.13281 47466 3227688 3227756 100 
UDP 256 3832400 33.00781 44220 11497200 11961820 104.04 





















ICMP 64 1945072 20.11719 85812 5835216 5868128 100.56 
ICMP 256 5803460 50 66963 17410380 17410640 100 
ICMP 1024 6156692 50.19531 17967 18470076 18470076 100 
UDP 64 547264 5.664063 24144 1641792 1663892 101.35 
UDP 256 1950780 16.79688 22509 5852340 5868200 100.27 




APPENDIX B. FIREWALL RULE SETS 
Table 15. Small firewall rule set. 
Action Source Port Destination Port Protocol Comment 
Allow Any Any Any Any Any Allow ALL 
 
Table 16. Medium firewall rule set. 
Action Source Port Destination Port Protocol Comment 
Allow Any Any [Host] Any ICMP Inbound ICMP 
Allow [Host] Any Any Any ICMP Outbound ICMP 
Allow Any Any [Host] Any TCP Inbound TCP 
Allow [Host] Any Any Any TCP Outbound TCP 
Block Any Any Any Any Any Block ALL 
 
Table 17. Large firewall rule set. 
Action Source Port Destination Port Protocol Comment 
Allow Any Any [Host] Any ICMP Inbound ICMP 
Allow [Host] Any Any Any ICMP Outbound ICMP 
Allow Any 53 [Host] Any UDP Inbound DNS 
Allow [Host] Any Any 53 TCP Outbound DNS 
Allow [Host] Any Any 53 UDP Outbound DNS 
Allow [Host] Any Any 137 TCP Outbound NetBIOS 
Allow [Host] Any Any 138 TCP Outbound NetBIOS 
Allow [Host] Any Any 139 TCP Outbound NetBIOS 
Allow [Host] Any Any 137 UDP Outbound NetBIOS 
Allow [Host] Any Any 138 UDP Outbound NetBIOS 
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Allow [Host] Any Any 139 UDP Outbound NetBIOS 
Block Any Any [Host] 137 TCP Inbound NetBIOS 
Block Any Any [Host] 138 TCP Inbound NetBIOS 
Block Any Any [Host] 139 TCP Inbound NetBIOS 
Block Any Any [Host] 137 UDP Inbound NetBIOS 
Block Any Any [Host] 138 UDP Inbound NetBIOS 
Block Any Any [Host] 139 UDP Inbound NetBIOS 
Allow Any Any 127.0.0.1 Any UDP Inbound Loop back 
Allow 127.0.0.1 Any Any Any TCP Outbound Loop back 
Allow 127.0.0.1 Any Any Any UDP Outbound Loop back 
Block [Host] Any Any 443 TCP Access to secure sites 
Block Any Any [Host] Any ICMP Inbound ICMP 
Block [Host] Any Any Any ICMP Outbound ICMP 
Allow Any Any [Host] 67 UDP Inbound Bootp 
Allow Any Any [Host] 68 UDP Inbound Bootp 
Allow [Host] Any Any Any TCP Outbound Bootp 
Allow [Host] Any Any Any UDP Outbound Bootp 
Block Any Any [Host] 445 TCP Microsoft Windows SMB 
Block Any Any [Host] 445 UDP Microsoft Windows SMB 
Block Any Any [Host] 135 TCP EPMAP 
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